This study examines the role of pre-IPO discretionary accruals in the valuation and underpricing of IPOs. We find that IPO offer price is unaffected whereas market closing price is positively associated with the levels of pre-IPO discretionary accruals for issuers with aggressively reported earnings. We also find that this relative over-valuation of managed earnings by the markets explains a portion of the initial return that is not explained by other known determinants. For issuers with conservatively reported pre-IPO earnings, there is no relation between discretionary accruals and the offer price or the market price, and the discretionary accruals do not explain any IPO underpricing. These findings suggest that markets do not seem to understand the implications of aggressively reported earnings on pricing of IPOs.
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Valuation and Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings: Role of
Discretionary Accounting Accruals
I. Introduction and Summary
The initial public offering (henceforth, IPO) is a unique event in the history of a company because it is valued by two distinct sets of external investors for the first time on this date. A well-documented and heavily researched phenomenon associated with the valuation of IPOs is that the IPOs are underpriced (Ibbotson, 1975) . Loughran and Ritter (2004) find that the average Initial Return, the scaled difference in the first day closing price and the offer price, is non-negative for all 23 years examined and that the amount of underpricing is as high as 71.7% (in 1999).
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Because the closing price and the offer price are determined by the markets and the underwriters on the issuing date, several studies have tried to identify potential sources for this valuation discrepancy, such as partial adjustment of information learned during the registration period (Lowry and Schwert, 2002) , buying positive analyst coverage (Cliff and Denis, 2004) , ownership structure (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Hill, 2006) , and behavioral explanations such as investor sentiment (Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh, 2006) and prospect theory (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) . Despite these explanations for "money left on the table," the large magnitude of the positive initial return remains a conundrum in the literature (Ljungqvist, 2007) .
This study identifies an additional source of this positive initial return, namely, earnings management prior to the IPO. Though studies have examined the role of earnings in IPO valuation (Purnanandam and Swaminathan, 2004; Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan, 2009) , no prior study has examined the effect of pre-IPO earnings management on the initial return and the valuation of IPOs by the underwriters or the markets. Recent studies provide clear and convincing evidence that the earnings are managed upwards prior to the IPO (Darrough and Rangan, 2005; Guo, Lev, and Shi, 2006; Zheng and Stangeland, 2007) 2
. If the markets (underwriters) are "functionally fixated" on the reported earnings and the earnings growth number, they can overpay (set a higher offer price) for the IPO stock if the pre-IPO earnings are managed upwards through discretionary current accruals (Sloan, 1996) . Because the underwriters are privy to additional private information on the underwriting firm and engage in due diligence on behalf of investors, they face relatively lesser information asymmetry than the markets in general. We would, therefore, expect the underwriters to be less influenced by earnings and earnings management (through accruals) than the investors. The investors' higher reliance on reported earnings and the underwriters' ability to better see through the management of earnings could lead to this additional source of underpricing of the IPOs.
We hypothesize that the larger the earnings management, the larger the extent of underpricing. As such, we test if earnings management can explain part of this welldocumented IPO underpricing anomaly.
Our empirical findings show that firms with pre-IPO positive discretionary accruals (aggressive reporters) tend to have higher initial returns, whereas no such association exists for firms with negative discretionary accruals prior to the IPO. These findings are consistent with underwriters and markets valuing discretionary accruals differently for aggressive reporters. In our subsequent analysis, we develop the underwriters' and the markets' IPO valuation model that incorporates the role of discretionary current accruals. Our results show that in the valuation of firms that manage earnings upwards, the underwriters do not assign any weight whereas the markets assign a positive weight to discretionary current accruals. Using a seemingly unrelated regressions approach, we test and find that the weight assigned to discretionary accruals by the markets is significantly larger than the one assigned by the underwriters.
These findings are consistent with underwriters being able to see through the implication of earnings management through discretionary accruals on current and future earnings, but markets do not. For firms with negative pre-IPO discretionary accruals, we find no relation between (a) discretionary accruals and initial returns, (b) discretionary accruals and market valuation, and (c) discretionary accruals and underwriter valuation, as well as (d) no significant difference in underwriter and market valuations of discretionary accruals.
This study makes several contributions to the literature. It is the first study that examines the role of pre-IPO discretionary accruals in the valuation of IPOs -both by the underwriters and by the markets. No prior study has examined earnings management prior to the IPO and its effect on IPO valuation. Second, by documenting that the upwards management of earnings through discretionary current accruals has no effect on the offer price but positively affects the first day closing price, this study explains a portion of the positive initial returns documented in the literature. Finally, for firms that are conservative in reporting earnings prior to the IPO, we find no negative impact on their valuations by the underwriters or the markets.
II. Hypothesis Development
It has been well documented in finance literature that IPO shares are, on average, underpriced relative to the first day closing price (Ibbotson, 1975) . Most of the underpricing theories are based on asymmetric information between investors and issuers. These models either assume that the issuer is more informed than the investors (Welch, 1989; Allen and Faulhauber, 1989; Booth and Smith, 1986) 3 , or that some investors are more informed than the issuers (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Benveniste and Spindt, 1989 Using the industry peer price multiples approach to valuation, they find that both the offer price and the first day closing prices far exceed the implied prices, with the markets assigning much higher multiples than the underwriter (offer price). These results are inconsistent with underpricing predicted by most rational pricing models but are consistent with the documented long-run underperformance of IPOs. They find that the level of earnings, accruals, and earnings growth forecasts are positively associated with the valuation of the IPO firm. However, they do not examine the role of discretionary accruals, used for upward management of earnings, on the IPO offer or the closing prices.
One potential explanation for this observed initial overpricing could be that the markets and underwriters interpret the same fundamental variables differently, especially those that are prone to manipulation by the managers.
In the context of IPO valuation, several other studies examine the role of earnings and other accounting information. Klein (1996) identifies pre-IPO earnings per share and the pre-IPO book value per share as positively related to the prices of the 193 IPOs examined. Hand (2003) , Bartov, Mohanram, and Seethamraju (2002) , and more recently Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009) by Sloan (1996) , this lack of understanding in the properties of the components of earnings can result in mispricing of a firm's stock. Sloan (1996) documents that a firm with high current accruals will exhibit lower earnings persistence and these differences in persistence can be used to earn abnormal returns. A subsequent extension of this line of research has concluded that abnormal accruals are mispriced as well (Cheng and Thomas, 2006; Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2004; Xie, 2001) 5 .
The issue of earnings management through accruals to achieve strategic outcomes has been extensively examined in the accounting and finance literature. Most of these studies try to identify a motive, such as meeting dividend thresholds (Daniel, Denis, and Naveen, 2008) or achieving favorable valuations around important events such as acquisitions (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006; Louis, 2004) and open-market repurchases (Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008 ) that earnings management helps achieve. In the context of IPOs, Aharony, Lin, and Loeb (1993) , using a small sample of 229 IPOs from 1995-1997, find no earnings management prior to the issuance of IPOs. They find very little evidence of earnings management for small firms or for large firms with significant financial leverage. Friedlan (1994) , using a sample of 211 IPOs from 1981-1984, finds evidence of earnings manipulation prior to the issuance of IPOs.
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) publish the first large sample study on the role of discretionary current accruals in IPO underperformance. They show that IPO-year (not the pre-IPO) abnormal accruals are manipulated and that higher levels of discretionary accruals are systematically associated with lower levels of future abnormal returns. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and Armstrong, Foster, and Taylor (2008) have raised concerns about the use of accruals as a means to earnings management in highly scrutinized environments such as that of IPOs, and they show that the pre-IPO accruals are negative, consistent with earnings conservatism. Armstrong, Foster, and Taylor (2008) , using a very simple valuation model, find that the IPO issue price is decreasing in accruals and discretionary accruals, and so is the executive compensation. They conclude this finding as a lack of motive for earnings management prior to the IPO.
Though earnings conservatism around highly scrutinized events such as IPOs is a plausible argument, there is considerable evidence that litigation risk or public scrutiny alone is not sufficient enough for firms to refrain from earnings management. Prior studies have documented pervasive earnings management in similar high scrutiny settings, such as seasoned equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a; DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefcik, 2004) , acquisitions (Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh, 2006; Erickson and Wang, 1999; Louis, 2004) , and open-market repurchases (Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008) . These findings suggest that extant public scrutiny is not a sufficient deterrent to earnings management through the flexibility permissible under GAAP. Further, the finding of average/median accruals being negative prior to the IPOs is consistent with earnings conservatism, but only on average. We argue that this evidence suggests that there are more firms that are potentially conservative than aggressive in their financial reporting practices prior to the IPO and that we need to examine them separately.
Some of the recent studies that examine specific industries or a specific source of earnings manipulation provide corroborating evidence. For instance, for a sample of technology firms in a period extending from -1990 , Darrough and Rangan (2005 document downward manipulation of R&D expenditures and discretionary current accruals in the year of the IPO by managers that sell the stock. Guo, Lev, and Shi (2006) reach similar conclusions in the context of high-tech firms. Zheng and Stangeland (2007) examine IPO underpricing and firm quality. They find that IPO underpricing is positively related to post-IPO growth in sales and EBITDA, but is not related to growth in earnings. This discrepancy could be explained by the reversals of accruals in future years. IPOs with greater underpricing are also found to be associated with larger decreases in accruals after the first year. The findings of Zheng and Stangeland (2007) also support the notion of earnings management prior to the IPO.
Accruals Mispricing and the Initial Returns Hypothesis:
If issuers use accruals and deferrals related to working capital accounts to inflate earnings and both the underwriters and the markets fail to understand these manipulations, we would expect their valuations to be higher for IPOs with higher discretionary accruals. However, if underwriters see through the management of earnings because of access to additional information, we would expect the underwriter valuation to be downwardly (upwardly) adjusted vis-à-vis earnings for firms with higher (lower) levels of discretionary accruals. Because the underwriters have the incentive to undervalue the IPO in any case, markets may not be able to decipher this type of underpricing effect from one that is strictly due to higher accruals. Because higher discretionary accruals result in lower valuations vis-à-vis earnings, we would expect the initial returns to be higher for these firms. Stated in alternate form, our two hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: IPO initial return is higher for firms with higher levels of discretionary current accruals.
Hypothesis 2: Markets assign a higher weight to discretionary current accruals than the underwriter in the valuation of IPOs.
III. Sample Formation and Variable Definitions
A. Sample Formation: We identify our initial sample of issuing firms by selecting all firms that completed an initial public offering between January 1990 and December 2004. Because of concerns related to accruals measurement using the balance sheet approach and lack of statements of cash flow data, all IPOs prior to 1990 are eliminated. Current accruals are computed as the difference between net income and cash flows from operations, and are adjusted for size using the average of total assets. Expected current accruals, also referred to as non-discretionary accruals, are estimated using current year change in revenue and net property, plant, and equipment (scaled by total assets). The weights assigned to these variables are derived from the regression of current accruals on the change in revenue and net property, plant, and equipment (with all variables scaled by total assets) in the estimation sample of industry peers in the year preceding the IPO. Discretionary current accruals (DCA) are computed as the difference between current accruals and non-discretionary current accruals. To compute pre-IPO discretionary current accruals, we need two years of data prior to the IPO year for estimation. The highest level of IPO activity is in the year 1997 (183 IPOs), whereas the lowest is in The mean DCA pooled all years is -0.19. This is consistent with the findings of prior studies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; Armstrong, Foster, and Taylor, 2008) that the average discretionary current accruals (DCA), estimated using the modified Jones model, are largely negative. A firm with negative (positive) DCA is more conservative (aggressive) in using its discretionary current accruals to report lower (higher) earnings.
More often than not, IPO firms report negative average discretionary accruals. Panel B
of Table II 
IV. Empirical Results
A. Accruals Mispricing and Initial Return Tests
We test Hypothesis 1 on the relation between initial returns and discretionary accruals by estimating the ordinary least square (OLS) regression model at the firm level with initial returns as the dependent variable. Our model specification is as follows:
The main variable of interest is DCA, the discretionary current accruals in the fiscal year prior to the IPO fiscal year. Firms with DCA greater than zero (POS_DCA) have accruals that exceed its "normal" levels, based on the industry benchmarks, by the magnitude of the DCA. These firms can be viewed as aggressive in recognizing income.
Conversely, firms with negative DCA (NEG_DCA) are conservative in reporting their earnings and have accruals below "normal" industry norms. LOGAST, natural log of the firms' total assets, provides a control for firm size 7 and an inverse proxy of uncertainty faced by investors (Habib and Ljungqvist, 1998; Lowry and Schwert, 2002 These results suggest that the firms that manage earnings upwards through accruals tend to have higher initial returns. For these firms, a unit increase in the level of discretionary accruals translates into a one basis point increase in return on assets above and beyond the industry average through management of accruals. Thus, a one basis point improvement in return on assets through accruals translates into a 3.2% to 3.3% increase in initial returns. These results indicate significant payoffs from the management of earnings. The coefficient for NEG_DCA is not significantly different from zero. These results suggest that for conservative issuers, there is no significant difference in the valuation of discretionary accruals. Either both the underwriters and markets do not assign any weight to discretionary accruals or they both assign very similar weights. To further understand earnings management prior to the IPOs as source of underpricing, we develop a specification of the IPO valuation model for underwriters (hired by the issuer to propose or validate firm value) and market participants (who participate in first day trading). We estimate the following two equations: 
, (2.2)
Both equations (2.1) and (2.2) are specified using the same independent variables.
The Nx1 vector of random error terms is assumed to have a mean of zero, but different variance, as follows:
Because both equations involve valuation of the same set of IPOs, the errors terms in these two equations will be correlated across firms. These equations fit into the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework proposed by Zellner (1962) . When estimated as stacked equations, the disturbances term will have the following variancecovariance structure:
where is an identity matrix of size N, and is the Kronecker product.
This structure results in more efficient estimates of covariance across equations, and enables us to test for the significance of differences in the magnitude of coefficients across equations (Greene, 2008) . We estimate equations 2.1 and 2.2 jointly, and the estimation results appear in Table V . The results from the underwriter (market) valuation model, with log of offer price (market price) as the dependent variable, appear in the first (second) column. The coefficients of the fundamental variables, SALES and R&D, are significant in both the underwriter and the market valuation models, consistent with the finding of prior studies. Underwriter reputation proxy, RANK, and auditor reputation indicator, BIG8, both positively affect the offer and market prices. The discretionary accruals, regardless of the sign, have no effect on the underwriter offer price because the coefficients for both POS_DCA and NEG_DCA are not significantly different from zero.
In the market valuation model, the coefficient of POS_DCA is positive and significant, whereas the one for NEG_DCA is not at conventional levels of significance (0.05 or better). In the tests of significance of difference in coefficients across equations, the magnitude of POS_DCA is significantly larger in the market valuations. These results suggest that underwriters see through the impact of aggressively reported earnings on valuation, whereas markets fail to do so. The findings in Table V provide sufficient evidence to reject the null Hypothesis 2 in favor of the alternate that the markets assign higher weights to discretionary current accruals than underwriters in the valuation of IPOs.
V. Conclusions
Prior studies have examined and found evidence of earnings management to achieve certain strategic outcomes. However, in the context of IPOs, the evidence of some recent studies has been mixed, leading to the conclusion that earnings management does not exist prior to the IPO. We find that the result of negative mean pre-IPO discretionary accruals is non-stationary when examined over time and that the proportion of firms engaging in earnings management is not that small in any year. The mean accruals are even positive in certain other years, with manipulation being quite widespread in some years. Our examination of firms that manage earnings upwards reveals that these firms receive a higher initial return on the day of the IPO. On average, a one basis point improvement in ROA from upward manipulation of discretionary accruals results in a 3.22% improvement in first day initial returns. This improvement is substantial compared to the overall magnitude of initial returns.
Under no circumstances do underwriters assign any weight to discretionary accruals in their valuation of the IPOs. This is consistent with underwriters being able to see through earnings management and the impact of accruals on current and future earnings. This differential valuation of discretional accruals could also be driven by the difference in information asymmetry faced by the markets and underwriters.
Underwriters who are privy to additional information are better able to see through earnings management or rely on other factors (or both) than the markets. 
Table I Sample Characteristics
The sample consists of 952 IPO firms going public during the period of 1990-2004 as listed in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. IPOs that are ADRs, units, REITs, offer price less than $5, and closed-end funds are excluded. The distribution of the sample is reported by two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code. Shown here are the cross-sectional regression models for the returns to IPO investors in the U.S. based on SDC data from 1990 to 2004. The dependent variable is the percentage initial return. DCA refers to discretionary accruals in the year prior to IPO. POS_DCA (NEG_DCA) equals discretionary current accruals when DCA is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. RANK is the underwriter rank based on Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and updated in Loughran and Ritter (2004) . BIG8 is the indicator variable for IPOs audited by the Big 8 public accounting firms. VC equals one if the IPO firm is ventured-backed, zero otherwise. LOGAST is the log of total assets. NYSE equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. NMS equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the Nasdaq National Market Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. AMEX equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. TECH equals one if the firm is in a high tech industry, and zero otherwise. CHANGE is the price revision between the midpoint of the initial filing range and the final offer price. CHANGEP+ equals  when price revision is positive, and zero otherwise. MKT is the average CRSP equal-weighted index return three weeks prior to issuance. MKT+ equals MKT when return is positive, and zero otherwise. Insider refers to insider retention and is defined as (shares outstanding after offering-total shares offered)/shares outstanding after offering. BV refers to book value of equity one year prior to offering. SALES and R&D are based on prior IPO year data. L(Variable) is defined as L(Variable)=log (1+Variable) when Variable is greater or equal to zero; L(Variable)=-log (1-Variable) when Variable is less than zero. MEANPS is the mean of price to sales per share ratio of the IPO firm industry. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 0.4807 ** *, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table V Discretional Current Accruals on Offer and Market Prices
Shown here are the cross-sectional regression models for IPO valuations from 1990 to 2004. Dependent variables are log of IPO offer prices (LogOffer) and log of first day closing prices (LogPrc), respectively. Pos_DCA (Neg_DCA) equals discretionary current accruals when DCA is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. BV refers to book value of equity one year prior to offering. Sales and R&D are based on prior IPO year data. L(Variable) is defined as L(Variable)=log (1+Variable) when Variable is greater or equal to zero; L(Variable)=-log (1-Variable) when Variable is less than zero. MeanPS is the mean of price to sales per share ratio of the IPO firm industry. Rank is the underwriter rank based on Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and updated in Loughran and Ritter (2004) . BIG8 is the indicator variable for IPOs audited by the Big 8 public accounting firms. VC equals one if the IPO firm is ventured-backed, zero otherwise. Logast is the log of total assets. NYSE equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. NMS equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the Nasdaq National Market Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. AMEX equals one if the IPO firm is listed on the American Stock Exchange, and zero otherwise. Tech equals one if the firm is in a high tech industry, and zero otherwise. Change is the price revision between the midpoint of the initial filing range and the final offer price. ChangeP+ equals  when price revision is positive, and zero otherwise. MKT is the average CRSP equal-weighted index return three weeks prior to issuance. MKT+ equals MKT when return is positive, and zero otherwise. Insider refers to insider retention and is defined as (shares outstanding after offering-total shares offered)/shares outstanding after offering. tstatistics are provided in parentheses for valuation models. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The difference model results, which are based on Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and F-statistics, are provided in parentheses in the difference column. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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